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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A SUPERMART
FOR LAW REFORM*
THE HONORABLE DOROTHY W. NELSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
Last year, I was invited to sit with the Supreme Courts of Israel and
the Federated States of Micronesia. While observing these courts, I dis-
covered that from Jerusalem to Ponape, there is a growing interest in
forms of dispute resolution which do not involve actual court adjudication.
Indeed, the Micronesian Chief Justice is anxious to implement non-ad-
judicatory forms as soon as possible to avoid the expense, delays, alien-
ation, and complex procedures that arise from the way in which we resolve
many of our disputes in the United States today. In Micronesia, there
also is a desire to retain as much of the customary law as possible because
it has been developed and applied by the people very successfully.
In indicating my approval of the Chief Justice's goal, I related to him
a story of my sabbatical trip to Israel in 1965. I was in Israel to study
the laws of marriage and divorce as they are administered by the religious
faiths of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Baha'i. In Jerusalem, I had
the opportunity to attend a court hearing conducted by three Greek Or-
thodox priests in long black robes and long white beards. Court was
conducted in a little quonset hut with paint peeling from the walls, a
simple wooden table serving as a judicial bench, and plain wooden chairs
for the participants. A wife was suing her husband for divorce. Her lawyer
stood up holding a handful of papers from which to plead her case, but
was gently waived down by the presiding judge who turned to the wife
and asked her to tell her story. She explained simply that, although she
loved her husband, she had to divorce him. For five years during their
marriage, she had lived in the upper floor of a house, while her mother-
in-law, who was too old to climb stairs, resided on the lower floor. As
there was only one entrance to the house, the wife had to enter through
her mother-in-law's apartment to get to her own. Her mother-in-law,
curious as well as bored, questioned her on her activities and gave un-
solicited advice.
*This article is substantially the text of the Simms Memorial Lecture delivered at the University
of New Mexico School of Law on April 19, 1984.
**A.B. 1950, University of California-Los Angeles; J.D. 1953, University of California-Los
Angeles; L.L.M. 1956, University of Sourthern California. Judge, United States Court of Appeals,
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The wife sat down and the presiding judge then turned to the husband.
The husband's lawyer also rose with a handful of important looking
papers, but once again the presiding judge waived the lawyer aside. He
asked the husband to tell his story. The husband professed to love his
wife, but also his mother. As a good Christian he felt a responsibility for
both, but being a poor man, he could not afford two households.
The three judges retired from the courtroom by stepping into the dust
outside the quonset hut. They returned five minutes later with their judg-
ment. The husband was to purchase a ladder. When his wife wished to
avoid her mother-in-law, she was to climb the ladder directly to her second
story window.
Note that the product of this proceeding was situational justice rather
than rule-making and refinement of precedent. The judges were concerned
with bringing the litigants together again rather than deciding who was
right and who was wrong. As I watched the husband and wife leave the
quonset hut, hand-in-hand, I could not help but think of what might have
happened to this couple under our American system with its Orders to
Show Cause, lengthy hearings, and high attorney's fees.
II. CRITICISMS OF THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
Over eight years ago, Chief Justice Burger in his Report on the State
of the Judiciary, said:
As the nation enters its third century, we should take a searching
look at some of the basic aspects and underlying assumptions and
try to determine, not merely how to tighten the "nuts" and "bolts"
of the existing mechanisms of the judicial system but whether fun-
damental changes need to be made.'
And just this year, at the Mid-Winter Meeting of the American Bar
Association, the Chief Justice declared that reliance on the adversarial
process as the principal means of resolving conflicting claims is
a mistake that must be corrected .... For some disputes, trials will
be the only means, but for many claims, trials by adversarial contest
must in time go the way of the ancient trial by battle and blood. Our
system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for
a truly civilized people.2
The Chief Justice is not crying alone in the wilderness; the critics of
our adversary system are many. One of my former colleagues on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Marvin Frankel,
1. W. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary (1976).
2. Burger, Midyear Meeting, Am. Bar Ass'n., 52 U.S.L.W. 2471 (Feb. 28, 1984).
[Vol. 14
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
has written a scathing indictment of the system in his book Partisan
Justice.3 He declares that the adversary system places too low a value
on truth telling,4 and that "there are other goods, but the greatest is
winning. There are other evils, but scarcely any worse than losing." 5
Frankel maintains that giving the lawyers so much power and so much
incentive to win leads them into adversarial excesses. He gives specific
examples. In the selection of jurors,
effective trial lawyers invest hours of hard thought imagining what
devices, ploys, dramatic shows, and special hints will appeal to which
prejudices of which jurors. . . . To the extent the attempts succeed
in distorting the truth, justice is disserved. To the extent the efforts
fail, there is much wasted effort and demoralizing contempt of the
legal process.6
Frankel also declares that wasted time for errors and reversals on
evidentiary questions is a problem. "[F]undamental is the fact that our
question and answer procedure is hardly a natural, expeditious way of
having people tell fully in anybody's own way what they purport to know
about the subject of the controversy." 7 Furthermore, he writes about the
abuses of the discovery process during which many lawyers demand as
much as possible and give as little as possible.8
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility
creates further problems. Canon Seven of the Code dictates: "The duty
of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law." 9 In other words, the
lawyer's duty is to maximize the likelihood that his client will win. This
raises the question: In what arenas is zealous advocacy inappropriate or
even destructive of the values our legal system is intended to promote?
The basic premise of the adversary system is, of course, that the best
device in the search for truth is to test the opposing views of disputants
by putting each to the proof of his or her claim. Thus, since each litigant
is presumed to be equally motivated to investigate the facts and to present
the case through able lawyer spokesmen, the theory is that the truth will
emerge to the extent it is discernible. 0
However, the theory falls short in its application. It is my experience
3. M. Frankel, Partisan Justice (1980).
4. Id. at 12.
5. Id. at 18.
6. Id. at 104.
7. Id. at 107.
8. Id. at 17.
9. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1979); see The Zealous Lawyer: Is Winning
the Only Thing?, 4 Report from Center for Philosophy and Public Policy 1 (Winter 1984).
10. McKay, Civil Litigation and the Public Interest, 31 U. Kan. L. Rev. 355, 361 (1983).
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that the competence and resources of opposing lawyers are rarely, if ever,
equal. It is a mistake to assume that truth will emerge from two highly
partisan arguments, mutually exaggerating the strengths and understating
the weaknesses of their respective positions. Furthermore, our rules of
professional conduct permit conduct that prima facie impedes a search
for the truth. For example, it is proper professional conduct to:
1. cross-examine for the purpose of discrediting testimony of a
witness known to be telling the truth;
2. exploit an opponent's evidence known to be false; and
3. fail to introduce or advise the opponent of material adverse
evidence. "
While no dispute resolution system can be confident of total accuracy,
the rules of any system should be designed to maximize the possibility
of an accurate result.
We should certainly take steps to provide for ethical and professional
controls of excessive partisanship. 2 Professor Murray Schwartz suggests
that the Code of Professional Responsibility be revised to circumscribe
lawyerly zeal by greater commitment to the truth. He would require such
things as having a lawyer report to the court and opposing counsel the
existence of relevant evidence or witnesses the lawyer does not intend to
offer. "3
Others have suggested that there is something about the structure of
our trials that forces lawyers into adversarial excesses. A more direct
approach might be to allow judges to question witnesses so the judge
could set the tone of the trial while the lawyer could fill in the gaps. The
judge would allow the witnesses to explain their answers and even ques-
tion each other. We might allow opposing witnesses to take the stand ad
seriatim, and even allow recesses when the court feels more investigation
is needed. In short, our trial system could be improved by adopting certain
features of trial procedures of civil law countries and blending them with
our own. 14
I. THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Even if we do all of these things and more, my thesis is that we must
also continue to develop alternative means of dispute resolution. Chief
Justice Burger explained the need very persuasively:
The obligation of our profession is, or has long been thought to be,
to serve as healers of human conflicts. To fulfill our traditional ob-
11. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Research Journal 543, 550.
12. M. Frankel, supra note 3, at 61.
13. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 553.
14. Pizzi, Judge Frankel and the Adversary System, 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 357, 365-66 (1981).
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ligation means that we should provide mechanisms that produce an
acceptable result in the shortest possible time, with the least expense,
and with a minimum of stress on the participants. That is what justice
is all about. 5
Although there are many legal experts and laypersons who claim that
there is an explosion of law in this country, the real problem does not
appear to be excessive litigation. The number of litigated cases is not
increasing at a rate faster than the population is growing. Present levels
of litigation are not historically unprecedented but may be seen as a
relatively conservative adaptation to changing conditions-the recogni-
tion of rights of women and minority groups, the creation of public interest
groups, and the changes in our perceptions and our knowledge about
injuries are but a few of the conditions. 6
What the data clearly supports, however, is the proposition that costs
and delays associated with some types of cases in some jurisdictions have
made the full adjudication of disputes an unaffordable luxury for many
disputants, even institutional ones. 7 Although the United States has the
largest bar and the greatest number of lawyers per capita of any country
in the world-the number having more than doubled since 1960, to over
612,000-it is estimated that one percent of the population receives ninety-
five percent of the legal services provided. 8 This means that many poor
and middle class victims must accept inadequate settlements or "lump
it," that is to say, give up any attempt to vindicate their legal right.' 9
They are effectively deprived of access to justice.
An equally important fact indicating the need for alternative forms of
dispute resolution is that the biggest users of legal services-corporations
and wealthy individuals-pay an enormous price for legal services. Legal
expenditures are growing at a rate faster than increases in the gross
national product.20
As we search for a wider range of dispute resolution options, we should
view them not as a substitute for the courts, but rather as a part of a
single but composite system of remedies for people in trouble.2' We may
hope that they will relieve court congestion, undue cost, and delay, but
so far there is no convincing evidence that such programs have succeeded
15. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (March 1982).
16. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know (and Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious Society, 31 U.S.L.A. L. Rev. 4 (1982).
17. See Center for Public Resources Dispute Management Manual (1980).
18. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Paths to Justice: Major Public Policy Issues of Dispute Resolution,
Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public Policy 1, 7-8 (Jan. 1984) [hereinafter
referred to as Paths to Justice].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Gallanter, Q andA, 1 Dispute Resolution Forum 5 (Jan. 1984).
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in this task.2" Notable exceptions may be found in new private modes of
dispute resolution, such as mini-trials for disputes between big busi-
nesses.23
It is far more likely that we will find that alternative dispute resolution
forms are superior processes for many cases. The United States is behind
many other societies, including those we regard as relatively primitive,
in providing relief for routine grievances that typically are not well served
by the paraphernalia of our system, including elaborate pleadings, dis-
covery, evidence, and complex rules of review. 24 The studies show, for
instance, that while mediation and arbitration programs fail to achieve
many of the performance goals related to court congestion and cost sav-
ings, they consistently rate very favorably on user satisfaction, perceptions
of fairness, compliance with determinations and, in most cases, reduced
levels of relitigation. 25 They may strengthen local communities by de-
centralizing social control functions in neighborhood dispute resolution
fora. 26 They may also serve process values such as as participatory gov-
ernance, procedural rationality, peacefulness, humaneness, individual dignity
and privacy, as well as timeliness and finality. 27 Furthermore, these options
offer a means for achieving sustained communication among potential
adversaries and for reducing the stridency that distorts the debate on so
many public policy choices.28
It has been suggested that the alternative movement is an attempt to
push the powerless out of the courts into second class fora. While we
should certainly avoid creating such a result, this view is inconsistent
with another view held by some of these same critics that the courts have
been a primary institutional tool of the power elite. Moreover, the recent
upsurge in interest on the part of the supposed power elite in modes of
alternative dispute resolution indicates that non-judicial, private, and "soft"
forms of dispute resolution are not necessarily second class justice to be
imposed on the powerless. 29 As the Ad Hoc Panel of Dispute Resolution
of the Department of Justice said so well:
In fact, the search for new ways of managing our differences can be
seen as signaling a shift in public values. With increasing awareness
22. McGillis, Who Should Pay, 2 Dispute Resolution Forum 6 (Mar. 1984).
23. Id. For a discussion of mini-trials, see infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
24. Address by Robert B. McKay to the Farrah Law Society of Alabama (Nov. 7, 1975).
25. Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 Just. Sys. J. 420 (Winter
1982).
26. Id. at 424.
27. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Process-A Plea for Process Values, 60 Cornell
L. Rev. 1 (1974).
28. Reilly, Who Should Pay, 2 Dispute Resolution Forum 3 (March 1984).
29. Green, Avoiding the Legal Log Jam-Private Justice, California Style in Dispute Management
(1981).
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that "we are all in this world together," traditional win-lose, adver-
sarial processes may be personally and socially less satisfactory than
more participative, collaborative problem solving that reconciles the
interests of all involved parties.3
IV. METHODS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The field of alternative dispute resolution is diffuse and rapidly ex-
panding. Two years ago, Mr. Ronald Olsen, Chairman of the American
Bar Association Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute
Resolution, stated that there were more than 400 private and governmental
agencies currently providing alternative dispute resolution services. In
addition, 188 communities in thirty-eight states had established "neigh-
borhood justice centers." 3 The creation of the National Institute for
Dispute Resolution has enhanced the development of the alternatives
movement.
An ad hoc panel appointed by the Institute has suggested that no one
approach is best for resolving all disputes. It may depend upon: (1) the
disputants' desire for privacy and control of the dispute resolution process;
(2) whether the relationship among disputants is of a continuing nature;
(3) the disputants' financial circumstances; and (4) the urgency of re-
solving the dispute.32 Professor Frank Sander of the Harvard Law School
has suggested that we develop a Dispute Resolution Center, subsequently
denominated as either a multi-door courthouse or a neighborhood justice
center, which recognizes that the multiplicity of problems mandates a
multiplicity of procedural responses.33 Although alternative forms need
not be under the shadow of the courthouse, the fact that the ultimate
adjudicatory mechanism of a full blown trial is available may enhance
the effectiveness of other forms of dispute resolution. At such a multi-
door courthouse or neighborhood justice center, a grievant would be
channeled through a screening clerk who would then direct him to the
process or sequence of processes most appropriate to his or her type of
case.
The grievant might be directed to an ombudsman who is knowledgeable
about public resources and who serves as a referral agent or as a fact
finder. The Swedish Public Complaint Board, which is a government-
funded and controlled agency, provides one model. It accepts complaints,
primarily consumer and landlord-tenant problems, by telephone and writ-
ten communication. It conducts investigations largely through corre-
30. Paths to Justice, supra note 18, at 8.
31. Forward to Monograph, State Legislation on Dispute Resolution 1 (A.B.A. Special Committee
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, June 1982).
32. Paths to Justice, supra note 18, at 9.
33. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
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spondence and telephone calls. It attempts to mediate a resolution of the
dispute and, if successful, it will issue a recommended decision. The
decisions are not coercive, yet they report an eighty percent rate of
compliance, perhaps because they often use television to publicize the
fact of non-compliance. In addition, when there is non-compliance, cases
are referred to a newly established Small Claims Court.
34
The screening agent in our multi-door courthouse also might refer the
disputant to a mediation panel. Mediation, like negotiation and concili-
ation, is designed to find ways of bringing the parties to voluntary agree-
ment.35 Although, like adjudication, mediation requires one or more third-
party intervenors, unlike adjudication, it is not coercive, formal, or nar-
rowly focused. It does not demand a win/lose decision. It is most con-
cerned with the underlying relationship between the parties. It may give
disputants a sense of accepting and owning their eventual settlement, and
also may mitigate tensions, build understanding and trust, and provide a
basis by which parties may negotiate their own dispute settlements in the
future. 3
6
A model experiment was established in 1971 in the Bronx as part of
a Neighborhood Youth Diversion Program. Volunteer, non-professional
neighborhood residents mediated disputes between adults and youths in
the community. In one case, three spirited, leather-jacketed youths were
charged with disturbing the peace and creating a public nuisance by
"hanging out" in front of a record shop each afternoon. When the shop-
keeper and youths were brought before the mediators, the shopkeeper
wanted to know why these youths did not have jobs and why they didn't
play their records at home. "Sir, are you offering me a job?" asked one
of the youths who had actively sought work in the community. Another
youth invited the shopkeeper to his tenement, which housed eleven mem-
bers of his family, to show why he didn't play his records at home. The
end result was that a number of businesses formed an association, rented
a recreation room in the basement of a bank, and hired the youths to run
it.
The model for mediation is the family model rather than the so-called
"battle model" of the adversary system. It has some of the attributes of
a tribal moot as described by Professor Richard Danzig."3 Instead of social
distance between judge and disputant, there is an emphasis on the bond
between responsible members of the same community. Rather than uti-
lizing narrow rules of evidence, the mediators encourage wide consul-
34. See King, Consumer Protection Experiments in Sweden (1974).
35. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305 (1971).
36. Paths to Justice, supra note 18, at 14.
37. Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complimentary, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice,
26 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
[Vol. 14
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
tation so that parties discuss all relevant tensions and viewpoints. Instead
of assessing blame retrospectively, the emphasis is on resolving problems
by consensus. Rather than a courtroom studded with symbols of power
which tend to intimidate and inhibit participants, proceedings take place
in familiar neighborhood surroundings, in a community hall or in a private
home.
More importantly, a neighborhood system overcomes the "out of sight,
out of mind" syndrome that has long been society's main theme regarding
the inner workings of police stations, "downtown" courts, and isolated
jails. Neighborhood residents, who become cognizant of the problems
through direct participation in the hearings, as in the Bronx example,
begin to seek solutions to the problems. This suggests the importance of
using laypersons in the system in roles other than as jurors.
Mediation is especially recommended for family disputes. Family me-
diators have recognized that divorcing spouses should be given broad
power to determine their own post-dissolution rights and responsibilities. 38
However, it is essential that the mediator possess skills in the areas of
human dynamics, interpersonal relationships, and conflict management.
Additionally, the mediator must possess the requisite legal knowledge in
divorce-related cases such as tax and finance.39 Recognizing, as Professor
Frank Sander has maintained, that family mediation has developed into
"an extremely difficult science or art," it is important to note that the
Harvard Law School is offering for the first time this year a Master of
Law degree in family mediation."
Our screening clerk would also have the option to refer a grievant to
some form of adjudication. These forms include arbitration, an admin-
istrative agency, a rent-a-judge plan, or other mechanisms that utilize
third-party adjudicators with authority to impose their decision on the
parties.
The great success of compulsory arbitration in the Pennsylvania state
courts has led to the adoption of court-annexed arbitration by several
federal district courts there, as well as in Connecticut, Washington, and
California.4" Arbitration, which has been widely accepted and used in
labor and management grievances and in some commercial settings, has
special advantages over the courts:
1. Arbitration can be initiated without long delays, the procedure
is relatively short, and a decision can be reached promptly;
38. Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing Family-Mediation not Litigation, 29 Loy. L.
Rev. 55, 69 (1983).
39. Id. at 70.
40. Id.
41. Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story,
42 Md. L. Rev. 787 (1983).
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2. Arbitration utilizes relaxed rules of evidence which enhance
flexibility;
3. Parties to arbitration may agree on the particular body of law
to be applied;
4. Parties to arbitration can choose the arbitrator and the site of
the arbitration;
5. An arbitrator can be required to be an expert in the subject
matter of the dispute;
6. Arbitration allows a resolution to be tailored to the circum-
stances;
7. Arbitration may allow a dispute to be private;
8. Arbitration may be less expensive to the parties and may not
require use of public facilities; and
9. An arbitration award in binding arbitration may be enforceable
by a court with little or no review.42
It should be noted that arbitration may become so formalized that it
may, as in labor relations, develop some of the problems of procedure
and delay present in the judicial process. It may also be more expensive
than a negotiated settlement might have been."
There are literally hundreds of administrative remedies that might be
offered in our multi-door courthouse or neighborhood justice center. An
innovative suggestion has been made by Professor Maurice Rosenberg
of Columbia. He proposes that a Department of Economic Justice be
established to handle small consumer cases.' Such a department could
dispense quick remedies in cash or in kind to complaining customers who
have been unable to get satisfaction from a merchant or manufacturer
responsible for a defective product. Rather than referring a person to a
neighborhood lawyer when that person's television tube has failed pre-
maturely, the department might give him the cash value on the spot up
to a maximum of $200 or so. Through a national network of offices, and
with the help of a computer, the Department of Economic Justice would
learn quickly whether a class action should be brought if a manufacturer
has been making defective tubes on a grand scale. To discourage cheating
by consumers, spot checks might be conducted similar to those conducted
by the Internal Revenue Service. 5
We should consider further experimentation with neighborhood courts
manned by volunteers. In many areas today, neighborhood courts adju-
dicate complaints and penalize offenders by assigning neighborhood ser-
vice tasks. This form of punishment suggests that we might look beyond
42. Paths To Justice, supra note 18, at 12-13.
43. Id. at 14.
44. No Access to Law-Alternatives to the American Justice System 84 (L. Nader ed. 1980).
45. Id.
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the Anglo-Saxon experience when thinking in terms of the neighborhood
concept. In a number of Native American tribal codes, the form of pun-
ishment typically is restitution and forced labor for the benefit of the tribe
or. the victim, rather than imprisonment.
Finally, the grievant in a multi-door courthouse might be referred to
some alternative form of court adjudication. Even here, innovative ap-
proaches have been developed. In Ohio, Judge Thomas Lambros has
developed what he calls the Summary Jury Trial, which has been used
in products liability, personal injury, contracts, age/sex/racial discrimi-
nation, and anti-trust cases. Acting on the belief that the sole bar to
settlement is the uncertainty of how a jury might perceive the liability
and damage issues, he designed a system to let the parties obtain thejury's evaluation of issues without affecting their right to a full trial on
the merits.
Parties are allowed opening and closing statements, and an opportunity
to give proof supporting their positions but only in written summaries
based on depositions, stipulations and the like. The six person jury is
given abbreviated instructions and an evaluation of the evidence by the
court. The jury returns a consensus verdict which is not formally recorded
nor are the proceedings open to the public. Ninety-four percent of the
cases have settled without a trial de novo. As a result, courts including
those in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Massachusetts are ex-
perimenting with this approach.46
In addition to public alternative dispute resolution methods, many pri-
vate dispute resolution forms are developing. Some corporations and other
business institutions are adopting a "mini-trial" approach. After a fore-
shortened period of pretrial preparation, lawyers make informal and ab-
breviated presentations of each party's "best" case before representatives
of the parties with settling authority. Usually, a neutral, third-party ad-
visor, not a judge or arbitrator, is present to advise the parties' represen-
tatives, if necessary, but the advisor's opinion is non-binding, private,
and inadmissible at any later trial.47
For example, in 1979, after several years of trying to resolve certain
contractual disputes, Shell Oil Company filed an action against Allied
Corporation for breach of contract. In mid-1983, pretrial discovery was
near completion, with trial expected later the same year. At that point,
counsel for both companies decided to make a final attempt to resolve
the dispute using a mini-trial approach. After several discussions among
counsel, a fairly simple format was agreed upon in writing. Each party
designated one business representative to attend the mini-trial and seek
46. Cook, A Quest for Justice: Effective and Efficient Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes,
4 Det. C.L. Rev. 1129, 1133 (1983).
47. See Green, The Mini-Trial Approach to Complex Litigation in Dispute Management (1981).
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a fair resolution of the dispute. Parties exchanged written statements,
after which there was a one hour presentation, in this case without a
neutral advisor. The business representatives met to decide the issues
which had previously been outlined for them by counsel. They reached
agreement immediately, on a matter that might have taken many months
of trial time."
In contrast to the purely private, non-binding qualities of the mini-
trial, the use of a private judge or "referee" pursuant to a general reference
statute, the so-called "rent-a-judge" program, has been established in
some states.49 It permits disputants to obtain a fast, private, efficient, and
competent resolution of their dispute while maintaining the benefits of a
final, binding adjudication.
It is uncertain how all of these programs will affect our legal system.
Some of them might promote collusion, secrecy, and combinations which
might promote violations of public policy. There are those who fear the
elimination of the right to jury trial, the weakening of the rules of evi-
dence, and the elimination of judicial supervision of lawsuits.5 °
What is clear to me is that if rights are not to be sacrificed, if justice
is not to be rationed in the interest of relieving pressure on the courts,
we need other justice-dispensing institutions which can supplement, and
in some cases supersede, the old ones.
V. THE NEED FOR EDUCATION
With the proliferation of new techniques of dispute resolution, there
is a need to educate and train many more justice-producing persons. There
is certainly a place for lawyers in their traditional roles representing clients
in court, arbitration, and other adjudicatory proceedings. Other lawyers
will want to be trained or retrained to play roles as dispute resolvers. The
new master's program in Family Mediation at the Harvard Law School
is a positive step in that direction.
We must educate other types of justice-producing persons. Paraprofes-
sionals might be trained as screening clerks for multi-door courthouses.
Other laypersons may be trained as arbitrators, mediators, and ombuds-
men. Perhaps the best approach is to be flexible, using volunteers and
professionals as the occasion requires. In the process, the legal profession
will be required to re-examine its rules on the unauthorized practice of
law, some of which may become outdated as these alternatives come into
full flower.
48. Mini-Trial Settles Ten Year Old Quarrel Between Shell and Allied Corp., Alternatives to the
High Cost of Litigation 1 (1983).
49. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 638-645.1 (West 1976).
50. See L.A. Daily Journal, March 3, 1983.
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Some fear the onslaught of volunteer "do gooders" who, though well
intended, are really exporting their own brand of justice. We certainly
should not disregard fundamental values protected by procedural safe-
guards in the current court system. These values must not be sacrificed
in the name of speed, efficiency or even harmony-goals which all too
readily may be converted into rationales for favoritism, paternalism, or
majority tyranny. The appropriateness of involving community volunteers
depends upon the nature of the dispute involved. There have been some
extraordinary results from these "non-pros." As one commentator has
noted: "If one of the goals of mediation is to help people resolve their
own conflicts, is it not often better to have that help provided by persons
of similar background and experience who have had the additional ad-
vantage of training in mediation skills and technology." 5
The role of law schools in the alternative dispute resolution movement
is very important. As President Bok of Harvard wrote recently:
[Liaw schools train their students more for conflict than for the gentler
arts of reconciliation and accommodation .... Over the next gen-
eration, I predict, society's greatest opportunities will lie in tapping
the human inclinations toward collaboration and compromise rather
than stirring our proclivities for competition and rivalry. If lawyers
are not leaders in marshalling cooperation and designing mechanisms
that allow it to flourish, they will not be at the center of the most
creative social experiments of our time.52
Law students should be made familiar with the advantages of various
alternative forms of dispute resolution. Their training should include a
beginning ability to represent clients in many of these different modes of
resolution. In addition, our law school clinics must begin to include some
of these alternatives. A fine example is the Small Claims Mediation
Program at Harvard, a student-run project offering mediation services to
people in nearby communities.53 The law schools have a responsibility
to assist in the training of other types of justice producing persons-the
paraprofessionals who might be screening clerks in a multi-door court-
house, the mediators, the arbitrators and the ombudsmen who may be
volunteers or paid professionals.
Law schools must teach law students how to avoid or minimize disputes
through a greater emphasis on preventive law. This means keeping people
out of trouble by anticipating various eventualities, and seeking, through
careful drafting of instruments and planning, to provide for them in
51. Letters to Editor, 2 Dispute Resolution Forum 11 (March 1984).
52. Bok, A Flawed System, The President's Report to the Board of Overseers for 1981-82, Harvard
Magazine (April 1982).
53. Small Claims Mediation Program, Harvard Negotiation Newsletter (Fall 1983).
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advance. There has been surprisingly little written on the "planning" and
"preventive" role of lawyers."
Further, law schools must train their students in the problems of the
legal system-in "Judicial Administration and the Administration of Jus-
tice," as I title my course at U.S.C. Law students should discuss how
we might "de-adversarialize" and "de-judicialize" matters that do not
require the full panoply of court process. All over the country we find
probate courts, a very large part of whose work is uncontested. Why
should we employ judges as filing clerks? Why impose the adversary
system on those who are not adversaries? The British don't; they have
developed a system of probate whereby wills are filed as deeds are in
this country and there is no court proceeding unless there is disagreement
among the claimants. More attention should be given to dejudicializing
some claims through no-fault insurance or to the removal of criminal
sanctions in some types of cases. Law students should learn how our
judges are selected and removed and what suggestions for reform have
been made by the experts. Unfortunately, courses on problems of the
legal system are almost always relegated to elective slots which only a
handful of students attend.55
Law faculty must engage in more education and research in the area
of dispute resolution. We need systematic evaluation of the various models
in progress so that poor ones may be discarded' and new ones suggested.
Almost no other university departments have shown the inclination nor
demonstrated the expertise to perform this function. To reach its full
potential the dispute resolution movement needs to develop into a part-
nership with research that will sustain a learning process to support cu-
mulative development of a differentiated system of remedies needed in
our society."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the legal manpower supply must
invoke, increasingly, the capacity of each individual in society to cope
independently and preventatively with situations posing the possibility of
legal injury. As Edgar and Jean Cahn have said so well:
[W]e would propose teaching legal concepts in grade school as a
means of protecting that fragile sense of morality and fair play with
which children enter the wider world. We submit that the child's
moral sensitivity and basic sense of fair play and reciprocity can be
reinforced and strengthened both as a defensive and offensive weapon
for the child's well-being in a manner that will enable him to cope
more effectively with his environment, to sort out real from fancied
54. The most significant work is L. Brown & E. Daver, Planning by Lawyers; Materials on Non-
Adversarial Legal Process (1978).
55. Bok, supra note 52, at 7.
56. Galanter, supra note 16, at 71.
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injuries, to honor obligations, and to hold both his peers and seniors
to standards of conduct which are equitable and rooted in reasonable
expectation.57
Children should know and understand the principle of "institutionalized
settlement." For example, in experimenting with a group of first graders,
you may throw a balloon into the air and ask the children to "play."
Usually the most aggressive boy or girl ends up with the balloon. When
you ask them what might make a better game, they intuitively respond
that there must be rules to keep the boys form pushing the girls, or the
girls from scratching the boys. They should be encouraged to recognize
that they have just opted for the "rule of law." The Cahns are correct in
asserting:
[L]aw ought to be taught long before children begin to accept it
cynically merely as a set of technical rules for dealing with the police
and avoiding responsibility for illegal actions. [This] entails restruc-
turing fundamental cognitive processes to include basic values, stan-
dards and concepts-freedom, justice, reasonableness, free speech,
due process, honoring promises, deciding like cases alike and re-
specting the rights of others."
The law schools should assist in this field of law-related education as
well.
VI. CONCLUSION
As we broaden the role of the layperson in the justice system, it is not
too much to hope that this will broaden the commitment of most to the
rule of law, will increase voluntary law abidingness, and will save much
time and hardship through the expeditious handling of disputes.
Let us also recognize that the fair and expeditious handling of disputes
will not be sufficient to bring about true justice in society. Even the perfect
system can only be the servant of a just society. Justice-producing in-
dividuals and justice-dispensing institutions must inevitably confront the
axioms that:
We shall never have true justice without the abolition of poverty.
We shall never have true justice without universal education.
And we shall never have true justice without the abolition of racism,
the recognition of the equality of men and women, and the acceptance
of the principle of the oneness of mankind.
57. Calm & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Public Interest
Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1005, 1021 (1970).
58. Id. at 1022.
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I close with the words of Holmes:
Law is the business to which my life is devoted, and I should show
less than devotion if I did not do what in me lies to improve it, and,
when I perceive what seems to me the ideal of its future, if I hesitated
to point it out and to press toward it with all my heart.5 9
59. O.W. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 194 (1920).
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